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Recent gene editing experiments carried out in human embryos have raised the
question of whether interventions like the introduction of a CCR5-132 deletion,
which could provide heritable resistance to HIV infection, ought to be considered
enhancements. Many authors have used the term “enhancement” in different ways,
some based on patients’ biomedical outcomes and others on their social context.
These classifications are often considered overly imprecise. Nevertheless, the concept
of “enhancement” could affect the ways in which these applications are regulated in
different jurisdictions, the availability of coverage by insurers or public health care, and
the force of public opinion in shaping future policy on gene editing. In order to ethically
situate resistance to communicable disease with reference to other techniques, this
article provides an overview of its similarities and differences with disease gene therapy
in embryos, gene therapy in consenting adults, and vaccination. In discussing key ethical
features of CCR5-132 deletion (including its frequency in various populations, biological
mechanism, benefits for individuals, and use in previous clinical trials) we offer some
potential guideposts for the continuing discussion on how to classify “enhancements”
in the age of CRISPR gene editing.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent scientific advances have heightened the debate over using “gene-editing” technologies like
the CRISPR/Cas9 system (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats; CRISPR-
associated protein 9) to make heritable modifications to the human genome. These ongoing
international discussions were partly catalyzed by two proof-of-principle experiments performed
in China using non-viable human embryos. The first study, published in 2015, attempted to modify
the HBB gene, which is involved in the genetic blood disorder beta-thalassemia (Liang et al., 2015).
The following year, a second Chinese team published the results of a study which, rather than
targeting a genetic disease locus, attempted to introduce the CCR5-132 gene variant, a 32-bp
deletion that prevents some strains of HIV from entering white blood cells via the CCR5 receptor
protein (Kang et al., 2016).
These two experiments have raised the novel question of whether gene editing aimed
at providing resistance to communicable diseases (RCD) ought to be considered similar to
therapeutic editing from an ethical perspective, or whether it ought to be classified as a form of
“enhancement.” In this article, we examine the reasons why this distinction might be important
to the uptake of gene editing, and provide examples of biotechnologies that have raised similar
ethical concerns. We also discuss the merits and risks of describing traits like HIV resistance as
enhancement at this stage in the development of governance for CRISPR.
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WHY IS THE CLASSIFICATION OF
“ENHANCEMENT” SIGNIFICANT?
For many years, bioethicists have written about the use of
genetic engineering to “enhance” human traits, including
its consequences for distributive justice, discriminatory
social norms, and the preservation of children’s autonomy
(Parens, 1998). While speculative modifications to intelligence,
strength, or attractiveness are more frequently discussed than
CCR5-132 editing, it is possible that they raise similar moral
questions and deserve to be classified in the same way. Although
the question of different labels for gene editing can seem overly
abstract, the loosely defined category of “enhancement” could
affect future uses of gene editing technologies through its use in
regulation, health policy, and public discourse.
Regulation
Over 40 jurisdictions have written regulations on human
germline genetic modification, most of which ban the practice
in some form (Araki and Ishii, 2014; Isasi and Knoppers, 2015).
For instance, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany have
strict laws against altering the human germline. While similarly
restrictive approaches have been adopted by countries such as
China, India, and Japan, the attendant sanctions are often unclear
and may not be legally enforceable (Araki and Ishii, 2014; Isasi
et al., 2016). The lack of guidance and oversight in these countries
could weaken public trust in science regulation (Caplan et al.,
2015).
Many of these policies reflect policymakers’ fears of dystopian
and disruptive use of technologies such as human cloning
(Knowles and Kaebnick, 2007; Knoppers et al., 2017).
Their scope is frequently outlined in abstract or subjective
language (Isasi et al., 2016): the UN Declaration on Human
Cloning instructs member states to prohibit techniques
“that may be contrary to human dignity” (United Nations,
2005); pan-European regulations on clinical trials prohibit
“modifications to the subject’s germ line genetic identity”; Israeli
law allows genetic interventions only where “human dignity will
not be prejudiced” (ISRAEL, 1999; European Parliament, 2014).
Regulations from Germany and India also prohibit germline
enhancement and express concern about eugenics (Indian
Council of Medical Research, 2000; Interdisciplinary Study
Group “Gene Technology Report”, 2008). Thus, classifying RCD
as an enhancement could result in it being more strictly regulated
or proscribed in some jurisdictions.
The label of enhancement could also prevent RCD from
falling under exemptions in some laws which prohibit germline
modification generally but permit interventions for therapeutic
purposes (Isasi et al., 2016). Treatment and enhancement are
often defined in opposition to one another in the context of
genetic modification (Committee on Human Gene Editing, and
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine,
2017). Thus, a preventive “treatment” for HIV might be included
in these exemptions, while an “enhancement” might receive
stricter scrutiny. As a related example, the Council of Europe’s
(1997) Oviedo Convention states that genomic modification “may
only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic
purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification
in the genome of any descendants.” It is possible that, in some
countries, “correcting” a genetic disorder would not count as the
introduction of a heritable modification (Ishii, 2015). However,
it seems likely that the introduction of an “enhancement” would
remain more strictly regulated in these cases.
Health Coverage
Even if gene editing to provide RCD in human embryos
is eventually permitted in some jurisdictions, access to such
interventions may be restricted by insurers or public health care
systems unwilling to subsidize costly “enhancements” (Buchanan
et al., 2000). Glybera, the first gene therapy approved in Europe,
was introduced at a cost of €1.1 million per patient, making it the
world’s most expensive medicine and resulting in disputes over
insurance reimbursement. The second, Strimvelis, cost €594,000
(Abou-El-Enein et al., 2016). Although RCD for embryos would
not necessarily be as expensive, it would have to be performed
alongside one or more cycles of IVF (in vitro fertilization),
incurring further medical, economic, and social costs. Although
the ethical ramifications of relying on IVF for gene editing are
still poorly understood, it is beyond the scope of this article to
outline these issues here (Zimmerman, 1991; Chambers et al.,
2013; Werner-Felmayer and Shalev, 2015).
In the same way that cosmetic surgeries are generally excluded
from both private insurance policies and public programs like
the United States’ Medicare and Medicaid, both types of payer
might choose to classify ambiguous cases as enhancements in
order to justify considering them as elective rather than medically
necessary procedures. This could allow them to avoid paying
for expensive new technologies which are also likely to be
socially controversial (Mehlman, 1999). However, some authors
suggest that therapeutic gene editing could help reduce overall
health care expenditures as well as the associated costs of caring
for people with cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, and other
genetic diseases (Zimmerman, 1991; Walters and Palmer, 1997;
Resnik et al., 1999). Members of the biotechnology industry
may also advocate labeling gene editing as treatment, given
their commercial interests in the widespread use of CRISPR and
related technologies.
Public Opinion
The development and use of new biotechnologies can be
affected by public attitudes, which influence resource allocation,
“political policy,” and participation rates in experimental clinical
studies (McCaughey et al., 2016). It is widely agreed that
public consultation is an important step in the present ethical
deliberation over the appropriate uses of CRISPR/Cas9 in
humans. For instance, the American College of Medical Genetics’
Board of Directors have urged “broad public debate” to inform
this decision (ACMG Board of Directors, 2017), while the
organizers of the International Summit on Human Gene Editing
stated that clinical germline editing would require “broad
societal consensus about the appropriateness of the proposed
application” (Baltimore et al., 2016).
However, societal views are difficult to assess. More public
surveys on gene editing have been carried out in the United
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States than any other country, yet there is still not enough data to
indicate a clear trend. A large number of respondents, although
not a majority, generally accept the prevention of inherited
genetic diseases. Most respondents draw a much stronger line
at modifications aimed at improving or “enhancing” physical
or psychological traits (Blendon et al., 2016; Funk et al., 2016).
Despite this clear discrepancy, no survey has ever asked a
question specific enough to elicit opinions on providing future
children with RCD.
This situation has limited experts’ ability to make evidence-
based theories regarding public opinion on gene editing, as well
as policymakers’ desire to take societal values into account. It also
raises doubts whether most laypeople have sufficient knowledge
of genetics to provide an informed opinion at this time, although
these beliefs could solidify as the technology becomes more
prominent. Labeling ambiguous interventions like CCR5 editing
as “enhancements” could reduce support from the general public,
regardless of the validity of these concerns; these opinions may
carry significant consequences for policy development.
CAN RESISTANCE TO COMMUNICABLE
DISEASES BE CLASSIFIED AS HUMAN
“ENHANCEMENT”?
Despite these potential effects, the term “enhancement” is
notoriously blurry. Definitions may refer to the procedure’s
means or its intended outcome. They can also focus on broad
social and philosophical issues, or on specific impacts upon
individual patients (Committee on Human Gene Editing, and
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine,
2017). In the former framework, authors frequently question
whether gene editing would represent a primarily competitive
advantage, or an “absolute good” benefiting its recipients
independent of their social context (Buchanan et al., 2000; Sandel,
2004; Fox, 2007; Cohen, 2014; Elhauge, 2014; Committee on
Human Gene Editing, and National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, 2017).
In the latter, more individual approaches, health is often
considered to follow a continuum with disease on the bottom,
“enhanced function” on top, and health falling in the middle
(Buchanan et al., 2000). Some consider any intervention which
moves someone further up the spectrum to be an enhancement,
regardless of the starting point or the endpoint (Walters and
Palmer, 1997; Quigley and Harris, 2009). Other authors define
enhancement as any change that raises someone into the “better
than well” range (Greely, 2008; de Melo-Martín, 2010). However,
RCD editing as typically envisioned would prevent a healthy
person from potentially falling lower on the spectrum, meaning
neither definition would apply.
Parens (1998) suggests simply adding the category of
“prevention,” but this does not tell us whether RCD would be
treated as an enhancement by the actors discussed above unless
enhancement, prevention and treatment are mutually exclusive.
This assumption may not be useful from a regulatory, normative,
or scientific perspective. First, many authors have referred to
identical interventions using each of the three terms. Second,
reference points on the health continuum depend both on the
population and the course of medical progress. Third, genetic
interventions could involve very similar methods and outcomes,
meaning that treatments intended for disease and enhancements
intended for healthy patients might be equivalent from a
purely biomedical perspective. And fourth, these categories
may not capture relevant social attitudes or realistic policy
options (Walters and Palmer, 1997; Mehlman and Botkin, 1998;
Elhauge, 2014; Committee on Human Gene Editing, and National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017). Given
these difficulties, it may be more helpful to examine RCD’s
similarities and differences with interventions about which we are
relatively secure in our moral intuitions, including gene therapy
in embryos, gene therapy in adults, and vaccination.
Gene Therapy in Embryos
At first glance, the two studies editing HBB and CCR5 in non-
viable human embryos seem very similar: the only significant
difference in their methods was the design of different guide
RNAs for targeting purposes (Liang et al., 2015; Kang et al.,
2016). According to the continuum-based definitions cited above,
correcting thalassemia would seem to fall squarely within the
purview of medicine. Norman Daniels (1985) argues that the
only obligatory forms of care are those which restore “species-
typical functioning” on a biological level in order to give patients
a “normal range of opportunity” in society. While definitions
of medical “normalcy” have been widely debated (Committee
on Human Gene Editing, and National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, 2017), that question is beyond the
scope of this article, and we believe most people would agree
that severe genetic disorders do not represent typical function
and result in a restricted range of opportunities compared to
“healthy” people. A similar argument could theoretically be made
for CCR5 editing and the limitations on opportunity imposed by
HIV/AIDS. In this case, the absence of HIV infection might be
considered “normal” or “species-typical.”
One objection to this interpretation might be that wild
type, HIV-vulnerable CCR5 alleles should represent normal
functioning, since they represent the large majority of people
in every ethnic group. In Northern Europe, only up to 14%
of the population may have copies of the CCR5-132 allele,
while in East Asian populations, the HIV-resistant population is
functionally nil (Stephens et al., 1998). In fact, it has previously
been suggested that introducing natural variants of sufficient
rarity into an embryo should be considered enhancement. Yet as
with the concept of “normalcy,” the question of where to draw the
line for rarity in a biological population remains somewhat open,
and allele frequency itself can change over time or geography
(Walters and Palmer, 1997; Parens, 1998; Committee on Human
Gene Editing, and National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine, 2017).
RCD could also be compared with interventions which, rather
than targeting clear-cut disorders like beta-thalassemia, attempt
to reduce genetic predispositions to adult-onset diseases. Just as
human behavior interacts with genotype to influence cancer and
diabetes risks, CCR5 editing would also modulate risks dependent
on environmental exposure. As such, RCD may represent an
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enhancement in that it would allow a future person to live
with fewer worries or greater freedom than their peers. While
the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis to avoid severe
genetic disorders has many proponents, the selection of embryos
based on Alzheimer’s risk has been widely criticized by ethicists
as an overreach of parental decision-making (Robertson, 2003;
Anderson et al., 2015). If there is an ethical boundary between
limiting future risks and addressing conditions with well-defined
existing etiology, it might be prudent to classify the former as
enhancement.
Gene Therapy in Adults
One appeal of the comparison between embryo editing for RCD
and gene therapy in adults is that both methods may involve the
same genetic “edit.” Indeed, somatic CCR5-132 editing in T cells
has already been tested as a treatment for HIV-positive adults
(Tebas et al., 2014). These methods are considered ethically
acceptable provided they satisfy requirements regarding risk–
benefit ratio and informed consent (Lander, 2015; Rodriguez,
2016). However, germline modification raises additional
concerns about unpredictable, inherited effects on future
generations who would have no say in the decision (Rodriguez,
2016).
It is not clear that consent is relevant to the classification
of enhancement. Many theorists differentiate acceptable from
unacceptable interventions based on whether they maximize the
“open future” of children, providing them with the means to
achieve their own projects, or whether they restrict children
to lives following their parents’ value systems (Feinberg, 1980;
Habermas, 2003; Agar, 2004). Yet even philosophers with vastly
different views on human gene editing agree that it could prevent
many sorts of goals from being sidetracked by illness (Buchanan
et al., 2000; Habermas, 2003; Quigley and Harris, 2009). RCD is
unlikely to represent the threat to identity or authenticity feared
by some of the legislators discussed above.
The second relevant difference lies in these methods’ effect on
future generations. Assuming people have genuine interests in the
health of their immediate descendants, it might be argued that
RCD editing represents an enhancement compared to somatic
therapy. This possibility, combined with the high price of gene
editing, evokes longstanding fears about societal stratification,
discrimination against the “genetic underclasses,” and political
instability (Walters and Palmer, 1997; Parens, 1998; Agar, 2004;
Joly et al., 2013). However, broadly subsidized RCD could be
seen as a public health measure. Similar to the way in which
vaccination creates “herd immunity,” reducing the total number
of people vulnerable to communicable diseases could help shield
those without the protective allele. For instance, South Africa’s
representative to the International Summit on Gene Editing
discussed CCR5 gene therapy as a potential strategy in dealing
with the public health burden of HIV/AIDS in Africa (Moodley,
2015).
Vaccination
Like embryonic CCR5 editing, vaccination often involves
manipulating someone’s immune system without their consent
in order to boost their resistance to infections. Interestingly, the
question of whether vaccines represent enhancement has already
been discussed in the literature (Bostrom and Roache, 2007;
Committee on Human Gene Editing, and National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017). Since vaccination
is morally accepted by most stakeholders, those who reject
enhancement have had to find ways to exclude vaccination from
its definition (Douglas, 2013). Daniels (2000), for instance, states
that vaccinations “exploit more fully our immune capabilities
rather than extending them.” However, many ethicists describe
vaccination as a clear enhancement beyond species-typical
functioning (Walters and Palmer, 1997; Harris, 2007; Quigley
and Harris, 2009; Roberts, 2014), and those who support more
permissive uses of human gene editing often cite it as proof that
enhancement is already being widely practiced (Parens, 1998).
In response, it could be argued that RCD in the form of CCR5-
132 editing does not actually represent a functional upgrade to
immune activity the way vaccination does. It merely changes the
structure of the CCR5 receptor in a way that limits HIV entry
into host cells (Lopalco, 2010). Furthermore, this allele appears
to be associated with a significant increase in susceptibility to
West Nile virus (Glass et al., 2006; Moodley, 2015). On second
glance, even a successful CCR5-132 deletion might be viewed
not as an objective enhancement so much as a deliberate trade-
off, with both advantages and disadvantages depending on the
medical context (Lander, 2015; Gyngell et al., 2016).
CONCLUSION
Recent experiments involving human embryos have raised ethical
and legal questions about the editing of genes like CCR5 in order
to promote disease resistance. Given the longstanding bioethical
debate over human “enhancement,” the labeling of these
techniques could have significant effects on their eventual clinical
uses. First, regulations in many jurisdictions refer to subjective
concepts which could be used to exclude enhancements. Second,
both insurance companies and public health care systems could
make or interpret policy in order to avoid paying for such
interventions. Third, ethics deliberation and political decision-
making could be influenced by public fear—whether rational
or irrational—of dystopian futures following from genetic
enhancement.
Although the concept of enhancement is nebulous, confusing,
“freighted with erroneous assumptions and ripe for abuse”
(Parens, 1998), it seems too entrenched in our language to
be ignored or replaced. While actual consensus about its
definition would represent an important breakthrough (Hotze
et al., 2011), we are not suggesting a new definition in this
article. Rather, our investigation of RCD has demonstrated
a number of ways in which using the ambiguous label
of “enhancement” as a guiding principle can be limiting
for the bioethical debate. Arguments for or against new
interventions should appeal to more concrete ethical concerns,
such as the provision of competitive advantages against other
members of society. Regulators should also consider using more
specific language in governance documents. In the present
context, however, we suggest that ambiguous cases be more
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pragmatically classified as enhancement or non-enhancement
based on considerations of the public good. While germline gene
editing does not seem efficient as a public health measure, it also
does not appear to raise significant ethical issues beyond the other
techniques discussed above. Therefore, we do not see a strong
case for considering it an enhancement in the present context.
For the purposes of this article’s more philosophical
arguments, we have assumed the eventual safety and efficacy
of embryonic gene editing. However, the technology is currently
agreed to be unsafe for clinical use (Liang et al., 2015; Baltimore
et al., 2016; Kang et al., 2016; Committee on Human Gene
Editing, and National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine, 2017). Given our lack of experience with these
technologies, the use of CRISPR in a human embryo at this stage
would be more likely to produce mosaicism and off-target effects
than the desired enhancement. Modifications capable of being
inherited by future generations must also be held to especially
rigorous safety standards. The risk of introducing disorders into
the germline of a healthy embryo, or of providing RCD to some
diseases at the cost of increased vulnerability to others, ought to
be taken into account in the calculus of labeling interventions as
enhancements.
It should also be noted that many ethicists argue against
editing human embryos regardless of whether it represents
enhancement. They express concern that any intervention
represents a slippery slope toward more problematic forms
of gene editing (Annas et al., 2002). Further dialog on this
topic can help us avoid inadvertently facilitating morally blurry
interventions. We should endeavor to predict conflicts which
could arise from different perceptions of these technologies, while
continuing to examine the relation between our ethical and
regulatory frameworks and stakeholders’ views on the concept of
enhancement.
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